Tokyo – In response to the casualty of “MOL COMFORT” which occurred on 17 June 2013, ClassNK established the Investigative Panel on Large Container Ship Safety, comprised of leading experts from shipbuilders, shipowners and academic institutions, to carry out the following course of action:
(1) Investigate the possibility of casualty occurrence
(2) Consider and examine safety of large container ship structure
The findings and outcomes of the panel have been consolidated into a report, which is available to download in both English and Japanese via the website below:
Source: Asian Shipper
Class society DNV GL breaks with official tale on MOL Comfort sinking
A “NON-ROBUST” ship design was responsible for the June 2013 splitting in two and sinking of the 8,110-TEU MOL Comfort, according to classification society DNV GL.The class society attributed the ship first splitting in two, then pitching about in heavy seas in the Gulf of Aden and then sinking, to the collapse of a hull girder. Speaking at the International Union of Marine Insurance conference in Hong Kong, DNV GL vice president Knut Dohlie said the girders and scantlings were not strong enough.DNV GL made this declaration before the an audience of marine underwriters only days before scheduled release of the official versionIt is bound to cause a major fuss around an almost unprecedented public disagreement between big class societies on an important matter, said Lloyd’s List. Longitudinal girders on the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries-built ship should have aligned to the container grid, and scantlings should have been as much as 3mm thicker, said Mr Dohlie.Mr Dohlie also criticised rival Japanese ClassNK and the authorities for making the inquiry all-Japanese event? which prevented wider technical collaboration.
Earlier DNV GL criticism of the MOL Comfort’s design, including statement that the class society has reject such designs as unsound, drew much attention months ago.Only an interim report has been published so far and the publication of the final report has been delayed several times, and is now expected to be released by October.While panamax boxships were long and slender and required 8,000-12,000 tonnes of ballast water in the double bottom for stability, post-panamax boxships like the MOL Comfort were broad of beam.Mr Dohlie said such panamaxers had, if anything too much stability? which was made worse by the addition of ballast water.The likely course of events leading to the disaster was that the MOL Comfort was built to a non-robust, uncommon design? he said.If the draught mark readings are reliable, he said, then the hull girder was overstressed and that a lack of ballast or its distribution caused torsion amidships and contributed to the collapse of girders.Given the weight distribution’s contribution to the casualty, Mr Dohlie said he was clearly in favour of having all containers weighed automatically at point of loading.