(www.MaritimeCyprus.com) At about 1527 on 24 February 2023, the twin screw conventional tug Biter girted and capsized off Greenock, Scotland while attached to the stern of the passenger vessel Hebridean Princess, which was making its approach to James Watt Dock. Biter’s two crew were unable to escape from the capsized vessel and lost their lives.
The investigation found that Biter girted and capsized because it was unable to reverse direction to operate directly astern of Hebridean Princess before the tug’s weight came on to the towing bridle and, when this happened, the tug’s gob rope did not prevent it being towed sideways.
The investigation also found that Hebridean Princess’s speed meant that the load on Biter’s towlines was between two and five times more than at the port’s recommended speed range. Thereafter, given the tug’s rapid capsize, it was unlikely that Biter’s crew had sufficient time to operate the tug’s emergency tow release mechanism.
Once the tug was inverted, the open accommodation hatch might have prevented air being trapped inside the wheelhouse, potentially limiting the crew’s chance of survival.
The investigation also found that the master/pilot and pilot/tug information exchanges were incomplete and that the opportunity to correct the pilot’s assumption about Biter’s intended manoeuvre was lost.
Further analysis indicated that the training provided had not adequately prepared the pilot for their role and that it was likely that the tug master did not fully appreciate the risks associated with the manoeuvre. Two safety issues that did not directly contribute to the accident have been examined in the report: the guidance to seafarers on what medical conditions need to be reported to their approved doctor; and that the tugs were not required to be fitted with automatic identification systems while operating in confined waters covered by a local port service that used this equipment to monitor marine traffic within the port.
Safety issues
- the marine pilot’s training had not prepared them to work with conventional tugs
- master/pilot and pilot/tug exchanges were incomplete and, with no shared understanding of the plan, the passenger vessel’s master and the tug masters were unable to challenge the pilot’s intentions
- the passenger vessel’s speed placed significant load on the tug’s lines and almost certainly caused the gob rope to render
- the tug’s gob rope did not prevent it being girted
- the tug’s rapid capsize meant the crew had insufficient time to release its towlines
- an open hatch compromised the tug’s watertight integrity and limited the crew’s chance of survival
Recommendations
Recommendations (2024/157 to 2024/166) have been made to Clyde Marine Services Limited, the tug’s owners, to:
review its safety management system and risk assessments to provide clear guidance on:
- the rigging of the gob rope;
- the safe speed to conduct key manoeuvres; and,
- to adopt a recognised training scheme for its tug masters.
Recommendations have also been made to: Clydeport Operations Limited to:
- commission an independent review of its marine pilot training and
- to risk assess and review its pilot grade limits and tug matrix.
Recommendations have also been made to professional associations representing pilots, harbourmasters, and tug owners to develop appropriate guidance on the safety issues raised in this report.
For more details, click below to download the full UK MAIB investigation report:
Source: MAIB
For more maritime investigation reports, click HERE.
