UK MAIB Accident investigation report: Ships collide resulting in 5 fatalities

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(www.MaritimeCyprus.com) In February 2026, the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) released its final report regarding the catastrophic collision between the general cargo ship Verity and the bulk carrier Polesie. The investigation concluded that the tragedy, which occurred in the German Bight on October 24, 2023, was "wholly avoidable."

The Incident: A Five-Minute Sinking

On the morning of the collision, the Verity (91m, Isle of Man-registered) was transporting steel coils from Bremen, Germany, to the UK. The Polesie (190m, Bahamas-registered) was traveling from Hamburg to Spain with a cargo of grain.

Impact: At 04:55, the Polesie’s bow struck the Verity’s starboard hull at a broad angle while traveling at approximately 12 knots.

Rapid Sinking: The damage was catastrophic. The Verity listed heavily and sank in just five minutes.

Casualties: Of the seven crew members on the Verity, only two survived. One body was recovered shortly after, and two more were found during the salvage operation in 2024. Two crew members remain missing and are presumed dead.

Critical Findings: Why it Happened

The MAIB report highlighted a series of systemic and human failures that led to the collision:

1. Failure to Follow "Rules of the Road" (COLREGs)

The investigation found that both vessels failed to apply the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.

  • Verity (The Give-Way Vessel): Under Rule 15, Verity was required to take early and substantial action to stay clear. Instead, it made small, tentative course adjustments via autopilot that were not obvious to the other ship.
  • Polesie (The Stand-On Vessel): While Polesie was supposed to maintain course, its watchkeeper eventually made a last-minute turn to port—a move that compounded the danger and injected further ambiguity into the situation.
M/V VERITY
M/V POLESIE

2. Acceptance of "Unnecessary Risk"

Both watchkeepers displayed a reckless willingness to accept an inappropriately close passing distance. The report noted that the closest point of approach (CPA) was as low as 0.1 nautical miles, yet neither crew took decisive action to increase that margin despite having ample sea room.

3. Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) Delays

The German Bight VTS was monitoring the area but intervened too late.

  • Communication Barrier: The VTS used a duplex VHF channel, which required an assistant to relay messages between the ships rather than allowing them to speak directly.
  • Counterproductive Instructions: By the time a forceful instruction was given to Polesie, the ships were so close that the intervention was deemed "counterproductive" by investigators.

4. Lack of Survival Time

Because the Verity sank so rapidly (within 300 seconds), the crew had no time to don lifejackets or immersion suits. The report suggests the lack of a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) on the Verity (not required for its size) initially hindered the reconstruction of the bridge’s final moments.

The bow section of M/V Verity lifted out of the water.
The stern section of M/V Verity lifted out of the water.

MAIB Recommendations

The MAIB did not call for new regulations, stating the current ones were sufficient but simply ignored. Key recommendations included:

  • For Shipping Companies: Remind crews to strictly comply with COLREGs and maintain a safe navigational watch.
  • For German Authorities: Review the use of duplex VHF radio channels and improve communication protocols for VTS personnel to ensure more timely interventions.
  • For the IMO: The Isle of Man Ship Registry was advised to propose extending VDR requirements to smaller vessels to ensure better data is available for future accident investigations.

 

For more details, click below to download the full UK MAIB investigation report:

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Source: MAIB

 

 

 

For more maritime investigation reports, click HERE.

 

 

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